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Abstract 
Restrictive employment protection legislation has been highlighted as one of the key 
reasons for lower labour productivity in Europe compared to the US. A variety of channels 
have been suggested, including recently a focus on the direct effect of employment protection 
on worker effort decisions. A range of evidence now exists that demonstrates robust, but 
small, effects of employment protection on effort. These appear too small to generate marked 
cross-country differences in labour productivity. This paper revisits this issue using 
representative data from Spain, focusing on temporary and permanent contracted workers 
who differ markedly in their level of employment protection. Our approach is to use a range 
of legislative changes aimed at reducing the incidence of temporary employment to estimate 
the effect of permanent employment on one aspect of effort, absenteeism. We demonstrate a 
substantial effect of permanent contracts on absenteeism. Our results suggest that cross-
countries differences in employment protection have the potential, through the effect on 
worker effort, to have a substantial impact on labour productivity.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Differences in labour productivity between Europe and the US are an issue of long-
standing interest (Prescott, 2004; Timmer and van Ark, 2005 and van Ark et al., 2008). A 
range of explanations have been posited to explain these differences. For instance, it has been 
suggested that the `knowledge economy’ emerged much more slowly in Europe when 
compared to the US (Aghion et al., 2004; van Ark et al., 2008). Another explanation, and a 
highly contentious one, is that markedly more strict employment protection legislation (EPL) 
in Europe leads to lower labour productivity (Bassanini et al., 2009; Dolado and Stucchi, 
2008; Capellari et al., 2012). 
EPL has the potential to affect productivity through its influence on labour market 
transitions and unemployment: this has been the source of a large and contentious literature 
(Lazear, 1990; Addison et al., 2000; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Acemoglu and Angrist, 
2001 and Kugler and Pica, 2008). Along with these effects on labour market transitions EPL 
could also influence worker productivity more directly through its effect on worker effort 
decisions (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008 and Dolado et al., 2011). Recently, a literature has 
developed that seeks to estimate this effect, focusing primarily on absenteeism (Riphahn and 
Thalmaier, 2001; Ichino and Riphahn, 2004 and 2005; Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005; 
Olsson, 2009, Scoppa, 2010a and Bradley et al., 2014). This literature can be summarised as 
showing robust and statistically significant effects of employment protection on absenteeism; 
more employment protection increases absenteeism. While these papers typically compare 
worker behaviour across large variations in employment protection, it must be recognised 
that the economic magnitude of these estimated effects are quite small. For instance, Ichino 
and Riphahn (2005) show that Italian bank workers who pass a 12 week probation period 
increase absence by 0.04 of a day per week, while Bradley et al., 2014 show that public 
sector workers who move from temporary to permanent contracts increase absence by 0.017 
of a day per week. These effects appear too small to lead to large differences in labour 
productivity. Other studies find larger effects in specific settings related to small firms. 
Olsson (2009) finds a decrease in sickness absence of 13% among firms of less than 10 
workers in Sweden who experienced a reduction in employment protection strength, and 
Scoppa (2010a) examine the effect of an increase in dismissal costs in small Italian firms and 
find an increase in sickness absence of 18%. Finally, previous evidence for Spain 
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demonstrates a small effect of permanent contracts on the incidence of absenteeism (Jimeno 
and Toharia, 1996). 
In this paper we revisit this issue and provide new evidence on the effect of permanent 
contracts on worker absence across an entire labour market. Using variation in the probability 
of assignment to permanent contracts that result from a series of legislative changes in Spain 
we demonstrate larger effects of contract type on worker absence than previous estimates. We 
argue that these are of a magnitude large enough to generate economically meaningful 
differences in worker productivity.  
In the European context the key variation in employment protection relates to 
differences between temporary contracts and permanent contracts. Temporary contracted 
workers are relatively easy to fire or face non-renewal of contract while the dismissal of 
permanent workers is, typically, extremely difficult. In the case where dismissal of permanent 
contract workers does occur this may still impose large costs on the employer. Spain is a 
particularly interesting case as it is known for both very stringent employment protection of 
permanent employees and at the same time has the highest incidence of temporary 
employment contracts in the EU. More than 30% of the Spanish workforce over the 1990-
2007 period was employed on a fixed-term contract at any given point in time (Bentolila et 
al., 2008), and these workers have very little employment protection. Previous evidence 
suggests that there is limited mobility between temporary and permanent contracts, for 
instance temporary contract worker chance of moving into permanent employment appears 
no higher than that of unemployed individuals (Güell and Petrongolo, 2007).  
The temptation in this context is to compare permanent and temporary workers to 
provide a measure of the effect of employment protection on effort. However, the 
identification of the effect of permanent employment on workers’ effort is complicated by a 
number of issues related to the non-random selection of workers into employment contracts. 
First, contract type is not randomly distributed across the labour market and temporary 
contracts are, for instance, concentrated amongst the young, women, immigrants and the less 
skilled (Kahn, 2007). Moreover, temporary jobs are characterised by features that may make 
them on average less desirable, such as lower levels of work-related training (Arulampalam 
and Booth, 1998; Draca and Green, 2004), lower wages (Booth et al., 2002), poorer working 
conditions, and an increased risk of work-related accidents (Guadalupe, 2003). A further 
complication is that these contracts could be used for specific reasons that may condition 
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effort choices. For instance, they may be used by employers as a buffer against cyclical 
fluctuations and/or for screening purposes (Booth et al., 2002; Green and Leeves, 2004). In 
the latter case, under imperfect information regarding their productivity, this may lead 
temporary workers to increase their effort so as to augment their probability of being retained 
by the firm.  
Together this suggests a variety of observed and unobserved factors that influence 
both the probability of being hired on a permanent contract and effort choices by workers. In 
particular there may be important omitted factors that lower the opportunity cost of being 
hired on a temporary basis. This gives rise to an endogeneity problem leading to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of contract type on absenteeism. This paper 
investigates the effect of permanent contracts on workers’ effort by exploiting four 
employment protection reforms between 1997 and 2006 in Spain that incentivised private 
sector firms to offer permanent contracts to certain groups of workers while leaving others 
unaffected. These reforms are used as a source of exogenous variation in permanent 
employment, which is then used to estimate contract effects on absenteeism. Previous 
research has already shown that these types of labour reforms affect the likelihood of being 
employed on a temporary contract. Kahn (2010) finds an effect of employment protection 
reforms on the incidence of temporary jobs for the countries of the EU-15 from 1996 to 2001. 
Dolado et al., (2011) use the 1994, 1997 and 2002 reforms in Spain to identify the exogenous 
variation in the share of temporary workers within firms so as to evaluate the impact of the 
extended use of temporary contracts on the productivity of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
Kugler et al., (2003) demonstrates an increase in permanent employment for men under 30 
and over 45 years old with a difference in difference analysis of the 1997 reform in Spain. 
The series of reforms and the large scale nature of temporary work in Spain make it an ideal 
setting to analyse the effect of contract type on absence. In this way, we extend earlier 
research on absence and employment protection (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Olsson 2009; 
Scoppa 2010a; Bradley et al., 2014).  
Our results suggest that being employed on a permanent contract increases the 
probability of being absent from work due to sickness by approximately 1.6 percentage 
points, and increases time absent by approximately 0.078 of a day per week. This estimate is 
substantially larger than that reported in the previous literature (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; 
Olsson, 2009; Scoppa, 2010a; Bradley et al., 2014) and we argue that it is of an economically 
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significant magnitude. In our setting the partial equilibrium cost of such a change in working 
hours is in the order of 4,445 million Euros, which represents a 0.41% reduction in Spanish 
GDP. Our institutional setting covers an entire labour market, where temporary workers may 
be employed in a variety of occupational and industry settings. While not the focus of our 
paper we provide evidence that changes in incentives to firms influences the assignment of 
workers to types of employment contracts across the labour market. We test the sensitivity of 
our instrumental variable results to violations of the exclusion restriction, i.e. that the reforms 
do not directly influence absenteeism, using the approach set out by Conley et al., (2012). 
Our results add to previous research by providing evidence of employment protection effects 
on absence in a broader economic and labour market setting.  
   
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND DATA 
Institutional background 
Spain’s labour market is characterised by high unemployment and high rates of 
temporary employment; the latter is the highest in Europe (14% and 33% in the EU-27 and 
Spain in 2005, respectively). Figure 1 demonstrates the evolution of the rate of temporary 
employment in Spain and the countries of the EU-15 and EU-27 (See Dolado et al., (2002) 
for a survey on temporary employment in Spain).  
    INSERT FIGURE 1 
Temporary contracts in their modern form were introduced in Spain in 1984 as an 
attempt to combat high unemployment rates. Specifically, a contract (Contrato temporal de 
fomento de empleo) was created under which individuals could be hired for a maximum 
duration of three years, with no constraints. Temporary contracts did exist prior to this (from 
1976 on) but were only allowed in very specific jobs that were temporary in nature, such as 
seasonal work. The 1984 legislative change removed this link between temporary work and 
job type. This reform led to a large and rapid increase in the use of temporary contracts. 
While there was no necessary link between job and contract type, in reality the growth in 
temporary contracts was concentrated in what could be considered “lower quality” jobs. 
Dismissal of temporary contract workers was relatively easy with no dismissal compensation. 
In contrast, permanent workers remained very hard to dismiss. Permanent workers must 
receive 30 days notice of dismissal. If the dismissal is due to objectively bad conduct of the 
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worker there is no further compensation. However, if the dismissal is due to poor demand 
conditions of the firm, dismissed workers receive 20 days full pay per year worked with the 
firm up to a maximum of 12 months full pay. If the dismissal is for any other reasons, 
compensation rises to 45 days per year worked with a maximum of 42 months full pay. In 
practice, most dismissals are not for the first two reasons and maximum compensation is 
paid. Moreover, if a dismissal was contested by the worker for being unfair and a judgement 
subsequently was made against the firm (i.e. unfair dismissal) they had to pay full wages for 
the period between dismissal and trial. This coupled with the relatively slow time to trial in 
Spain implies a large additional dismissal cost. Together, this helps to explain why temporary 
contracts proliferated once they were introduced.   
The scale of the temporary employment sector generated by the original reform was 
eventually viewed as undesirable and has led to a number of subsequent reforms aimed at 
reducing the level of temporary employment, and reducing the size of the disparity between 
permanent and temporary contract conditions. Of specific interest is the series of reforms that 
began in 1997. In 1997 a new type of permanent contract was created (Contrato de Fomento 
de la Contratacion Indefinida, CFCI). The key characteristics were tax breaks for 2 years for 
firms to hire a worker on this type of contract, and lower potential dismissal costs than 
standard permanent contracts. The lower dismissal costs of CFCI workers primarily took the 
form of a lower level of compensation of 33 days full pay per year worked (as compared to 
45 for other permanent workers) and a reduction in the maximum period of full pay from 42 
to 24 months. Only certain groups of workers could be offered these contracts, 18-29 year 
olds, workers older than 45 years, long-term unemployed (at least one year), disabled workers 
and workers currently on temporary contracts within the firm. The eligible groups were 
subsequently expanded in 2001 to also include 16 and 17 year olds, unemployed women 
between 16 and 45 years old, those unemployed for at least 6 months and women in sectors 
where they were under-represented. Another key change that reduced the `distance’ between 
contract types was that, in certain cases, temporary contract workers were now eligible for 
dismissal compensation of 8 days. 
Further reforms on the 14th of December 2002, extended this contract to women who 
gave birth in the last 24 months, but also introduced `express dismissal’ (despido express). 
This lowered dismissal costs of all permanent workers markedly as the employer did not have 
to pay processing wages if they accepted that the dismissal was unfair within 48 hours, but 
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still had to pay dismissal compensation. Finally in 2006 (active from the 31st December 2006) 
these CFCIs were extended to cover essentially all workers. In addition, the tax breaks for 
hiring these workers were changed from a proportion of the wage to a specific amount, which 
favours the hiring of lower wage workers on these contracts. The period of payment of these 
breaks was also extended from 2 to 4 years. Together these can be seen as progressively 
inclusive reforms, in terms of coverage, that reduce the dismissal costs related to hiring 
workers on permanent contracts.  
In terms of the impact of these reforms on the Spanish labour market, previous 
research demonstrates that the reforms of the 1990s had a very limited effect on the use of 
employment contracts in Spain (see for instance Kugler et al., 2003; García Perez and 
Rebollo, 2009a and 2009b and Mendez, 2012). By the mid-2000s, the share of temporary 
jobs remained very high and the conversion rate into open-ended contracts remained low and 
stable at around 4% of the total number of contracts (Bentolila et al., 2008). Since the 
approval of the 2006 reform, there has been a substantial reduction in the temporary 
employment rate but part of the reduction can be attributed to the large destruction of 
temporary jobs in the construction industry. However, as we demonstrate, the 1997, 2001, 
2002 and 2006 reforms have an effect on the assignment of workers to contracts by private 
firms in Spain and this constitutes a key part of our identification strategy.1  
 
Data 
The data we use in this paper are drawn from the Longitudinal Spanish Labour Force Survey 
(herein LSLFS). The LSLFS is a quarterly representative survey that provides a range of 
information on individual and work characteristics. It is a rotating panel data set that follows 
individuals for 6 consecutive quarters. It contains 2,561,917 observations for 830,183 
different workers in the period spanning 1st quarter of 1996 to 4th quarter of 2008.2 The 
chosen period is crucial for identification purposes since it contains four labour market 
                                                          
1 An additional requirement of our identification strategy is that these reforms do not have an effect directly on 
absenteeism. While a recent reform in 2012 was explicitly aimed at tackling problems related to workplace 
absenteeism, previous reforms did not have provisions aimed at addressing absenteeism, nor is absenteeism  
discussed as an issue in these reforms. Moreover, Blázquez (2012) demonstrates that the absence rates and 
levels of both temporary and permanent workers were stable over the period of 1996-2004. 
2 The Spanish Labour Force Survey has been demonstrated to have an internationally consistent definition of 
absence (Barmby et al., 2002). 
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reforms and both the period and the reforms are not associated with any major economic 
crisis.3 This makes it less likely that the decrease in temporary employment is due to a 
general drop in labour demand and employment levels. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
Information on usual and actual hours of work per week forms the basis of our 
measures of both the extensive and intensive margins of absence. The extensive margin is a 
variable that takes value 1 when usual hours are greater than actual hours and value 0 if they 
are the same. The intensive margins of absence are calculated as deviations from contractual 
hours either in absolute terms or as an absence rate. We follow previous literature and treat 
usual hours as synonymous with contractual hours (Barmby et al 1999 and 2002; Lozano, 
2011, Green and Navarro, 2012; Shi and Skuterud, 2014). Hence, the hours a worker is 
absent per week is calculated as the difference between usual and actual 
hours, eit
u
itit HHA  . For ease of interpretation we multiply this number by 60 so that the 
estimated coefficients are in terms of minutes of absence. The absence rate is defined as the 
ratio of the hours reported absent to contractual hours in the reference week uititit HAAR  . 
Respondents to the LSLFS provide information on the reasons for any difference between 
usual and actual hours. In our main models we use variation that is reported by the worker 
corresponding to two measures of absenteeism, a broader one, general absence that includes 
all reasons by which usual and actual hours differ and another one that is restricted to 
sickness absence only.4 This is done for two main reasons. First, while existing literature has 
generally focussed only on sickness absence, this has been from administrative sources, 
which in that setting means absence due to illness/sickness with pay (Ichino and Riphahn, 
2005; Bradley et al, 2014). In a survey data setting such as ours, it is not clear how an 
individual who, for instance took time off due to family/personal reasons, but claimed sick 
pay would respond. Moreover, as our interest is in how effort changes with employment 
protection, it seems appropriate to consider all variations in absence that may be correlated 
with contract type as any unplanned (to the firm) deviation from contractual hours may be 
costly to the firm. The second reason relates to potential inconsistencies in how sickness 
                                                          
3 We stop our sample just after the fall of Lehman Brothers which could be considered as the start of the 
financial crisis. 
4 In the Spanish Labour Force Survey if actual hours are reported as less than contractual hours the respondent 
has to provide one out of sixteen categorical reasons for being absent.  
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absence is recorded in the final period of our study (from 2005 on), where there appears to be 
a drop in the level of recorded sickness absence even where overall general absence remains 
stable. In this way, our general absence measures provide a valuable robustness check on the 
sickness absence results. 
Our choice to examine three dimensions of absenteeism (the extensive margin and 
two forms of intensive margin) is motivated by a desire to illustrate a broad picture of 
absence behaviour. That is, absenteeism may be higher amongst permanent workers due to it 
being a more frequent phenomenon amongst permanent contract workers or permanent 
workers taking longer absence spells. At the same time, using the absence rate, in addition to 
actual time absent, allows us to examine the robustness of our results to underlying variation 
in contractual hours.  
Figure 2 provides preliminary evidence on the association between general absence 
and contract type, where the three panels refer to our three measures of absenteeism. To aid 
with presentation we plot these as 5 year moving averages and show the timing of the four 
reforms. Three things are notable. First there is a marked and stable difference over time in 
the absence levels of temporary and permanent contract employees. For instance, temporary 
workers are, on average, absent from work 90 minutes less a week than permanent workers. 
Second, overall absence levels for both types of workers are high, which reflects the use of all 
differences in usual and actual hours. The final point relates to the reforms. There doesn’t 
appear to be any visual evidence of a direct relationship between the labour market reforms 
and the absence behaviour of temporary and permanent workers. The contract gaps appear 
quite similar either side of four reforms. This could reflect the smoothing of the data, 
however we formally tested the difference in average absenteeism between temporary and 
permanent workers at 6 months before and after each reform and found no statistical evidence 
of a change. This provides some preliminary evidence that these reforms may be validly 
excluded in absence regressions.  
Table A1 presents summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis 
for the whole sample and by permanent and temporary workers, respectively. Along with our 
measures of absence these include dummies for gender, marital status, education level and 
each of the age brackets. Also included are controls for the worker’s type of contract and 
whether the individual works in the public sector, along with tenure, tenure squared, industry 
and occupation dummies. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND IDENTIFICATION 
Our identification approach draws upon Kahn (2010) who demonstrates the effect of 
European employment protection reforms on the incidence of temporary work contracts, and 
Kugler et al., (2003) who demonstrate how the 1997 reform increased the assignment of 
younger workers to permanent contracts in Spain. Specifically, we use as exclusion 
restrictions in the second-stage the effect of the 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2006 employment 
protection reforms for treated workers as a source of exogenous variation in the assignment 
of contract type.5 The standard identifying assumption is that the chosen instrumental 
variables are relevant and validly excluded. The relevance condition requires that there is a 
correlation between these reforms for the treatment group Z and the likelihood of permanent 
employment   0, PermZE . With respect to the validity condition, our assumption is that 
our instruments affect workers absence behaviour only through its effect on temporary 
contracts but not directly   0, ZE . An argument in support of this assumption is that 
government policy aimed at introducing temporary contracts and reducing dismissal costs has 
had the primary objective of fighting high unemployment. Although workers’ absence leads 
to significant costs for firms, and in countries like Spain absence levels are very high, 
governments have generally ignored this aspect when designing employment protection 
reforms. Furthermore, it has been shown that there is no effect of these EPL reforms on the 
overall employment level in Spain (Kahn, 2010). In the results section we further discuss the 
statistical validity of our instruments. 
We present OLS, Fixed Effects and IV estimates of the effects of permanent contracts 
on worker’s absence behaviour based on variants of the following specification: 
,itititiit XPermA                                                                              (1) 
ititiit vXRRRRPerm   2006200220011997 4321                        (2) 
Where the parameter   in equation (1) provides the effect of being employed on a 
permanent contract, itPerm , on  workers’ absence behaviour, i tA . itPerm  is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if the worker is hired on a permanent contract and 0 on a temporary one. 
                                                          
5  Similarly, Dolado et al., (2011) use the 1994, 1997 and 2001/2002 Spanish labour market reforms to identify 
the exogenous variation in the shares of temporary workers when they evaluate the impact of the extended use 
of temporary contracts on the productivity of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
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Our dependent variable, i tA  is measured either at the extensive or the intensive margin of 
absence (absence incidence versus minutes difference or absence rate). X  is a set of standard 
control variables such as age dummies, gender, marital status, education, sector of 
employment, industry, occupation, regional, year and quarter dummies.  
Equation (2) provides the relationship between the probability of being employed on a 
permanent contract to the reforms of 1997, 2001, 2002 and 2006. R1997, R2001, R2002 and 
R2006 are dummy variables that take the value of unity for the treatment group after the 
reform was implemented and zero before implementation. We follow the approach of Kugler 
et al., (2003) in assigning workers to treatment by relying on age and gender variation in the 
coverage of each reform.6 The treatment group for the 1997 reform is workers 18-29 and 
older than 45 years old; the treatment group for the 2001 reform are 16-17 year old workers 
and women in occupations where they were under-represented. 7 For 2002 the treatment 
group includes women in the years they are most likely to give birth (25-39 years old) from 
the 14th of December 2002. R2006 is not identified independently from the year effect and 
takes value one from the 31st of December 2006 onwards.8 As a result, The coefficients 1 , 
2 , 3  and 4 are interpreted as the average increase in the probability of permanent 
employment attributable to the legal change. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Table 1 report estimates of the relationship between permanent contract work and 
absenteeism, where for brevity report the estimated parameters for the controls but these are 
available from the authors by request.9 The extensive margin is estimated by Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) and the intensive margins by OLS.10 These estimates provide initial 
                                                          
6 We do not exploit the changes in coverage in terms of the long term unemployed as this information is not 
consistently recorded in our data. These data issues are noted in Kugler et al., (2002).  
7 Occupations where women are under-represented are defined in the Orden Ministerial of 16 of September 
1998. 
8 In robustness checks our main results are not affected by removing this last reform. 
9 These covariate estimates follow patterns noted previously in the literature on worker absenteeism.  
10 The sign, magnitude and significance of our estimates were unaffected when we estimated the absence rate 
with a Tobit model that takes censoring into account. Likewise estimation of the extensive margin by probit 
does not materially affect our estimates. 
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evidence that permanent workers have a statistically significant higher level of sickness 
absence and absence overall. However, the sickness absence differences are small in 
magnitude. For instance the OLS estimate of minutes difference between permanent and 
temporary workers, reveal that permanent workers take 4 more minutes per week off on 
average. Using a standard 8 hour working day, this is approximately 0.008 of a day per week. 
These small, but robust, differences are smaller than those reported in previous literature such 
as Ichino and Riphahn (2005) who observe a 0.04 of a day within worker effect of becoming 
permanent, or 0.017 of a day in Bradley et al., (2014) study of public sector workers in 
Australia.  
INSERT TABLE 1 
Looking instead at the general absence results, these are substantially bigger, just 
under one hours difference in absence per week between temporary and permanent contract 
workers. This suggests that narrowly focusing on self-reported sickness absence may miss 
much of the variation in the effect of employment contract on worker absence. In turn, the 
estimates for general absence provide some initial indication of potentially large productivity 
differences across contract types. In practice these preliminary differences in absence by 
contract type may be related to fixed and time varying unobserved differences between 
workers hired on temporary and permanent contracts. Our estimation strategy seeks to 
address this by first considering models that include worker level fixed effects before moving 
on to IV estimation.  
INSERT TABLE 2 
Hiring into the public sector and private sectors and the underlying level of employment 
protection are likely to be different. For instance, in terms of hiring public sector employment 
in Spain is often the result of public entry examinations. These types of factors lead us to 
provide separate estimates for each sector. Table 2 provides estimates for private sector and 
public sector employees separately. These highlight the fact that there are absence differences 
by contract in both sectors, where the private sector results are more robust and more broadly 
in line with those presented in Table 1. Our estimates for the private sector indicate that 
taking into account worker fixed effect reduces the impact of permanent contracts on general 
absence substantially when compared to the OLS estimates, but remain large and statistically 
significant, in the order of 30 minutes per week. For sickness absence this pattern is less 
clear, there are statistically significant differences by contract type, but these are essentially 
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unchanged across OLS and FE estimation. There are larger differences in absenteeism across 
contract type in the public sector. However, once time invariant characteristics are controlled 
for there is no difference in absence across contract type. These fixed effects estimates are 
identified by movements between contracts within the public sector. Hence, one 
interpretation of this result is that selection into contract type by time invariant worker 
characteristics within the public sector completely explains absence differentials by contract 
type.  
While we acknowledge that absenteeism in public sector employment is of interest, and 
this interest is reflected in previous research (Scoppa 2010b, De Paola et al., 2014), our 
identification approach is not well suited to the public sector. As the reforms acted to change 
dismissal costs to employers one might think that profit orientated, private sector, firms may 
be more responsive to these incentives. Indeed, initial trials of our instrumental variable 
strategy for the public sector were not encouraging. These reforms often have a weak or no 
effect on the probability of gaining a permanent contract in the public sector. As a result, we 
focus on the private sector where these incentives are likely to be more salient.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
One natural concern is the comparability of temporary and permanent workers. Temporary 
and permanent contracts are not randomly distributed across the Spanish labour market and 
one particular further concern may be that there is substantial selection into contract status on 
the basis of time varying unobservables. This will lead to biased estimates of contract effects 
on absenteeism. With this in mind we now proceed to our instrumental variable strategy 
where we exploit labour reforms as a source of exogenous variation in the assignment to 
contract type.  
Table 3 reports the instrumental variable estimates. The first stage estimates, which 
provide the effect of each reform on the probability of gaining a permanent contract, are 
informative in themselves. The 1997 reform (26th of December 1997, first quarter of 1998), 
through the reduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs, increased the conversion of 
temporary into permanent contracts/employment for young (18-29 years old) and older 
workers (+ 45 years old) compared to workers in the middle age group (30-44 years old). The 
effect is a 2 percentage point increase. This is similar to the estimates reported by Kugler et 
al., (2003) for the same reform in the order of 2.5 percentage points. We go further and show 
that all four reforms lead to an increase in the likelihood of gaining a permanent contracted 
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job. Specifically, the 2001 reform (9th of July 2001, 3rd quarter 2001) and 2006 reform (31st of 
December 2006, first quarter of 2007) lead to an increase in 2.6 percentage points and 3.4 
percentage point, respectively. The 2002 reform (14th of December 2002, first quarter of 
2003) also increased movement into permanent contracts but had a smaller effect of just 0.7 
percentage points. This fits expectations insofar as the 2002 reform can be viewed as a minor 
extension of the previous two reforms. These results are interesting in themselves as they 
show how changes in dismissal costs have incentive effects on private sector firms 
influencing their willingness to offer permanent contracts. In terms of diagnostics, our 
instruments are strong predictors of contract type. However, the Hansen-test leads us to reject 
the null hypothesis of the instruments being validly excluded from the absence equations. We 
return to this point later and examine the robustness of our results to relaxing this assumption.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports the resultant IV estimates of permanent contract effects on 
absence. When compared to previous OLS and FE estimates these are markedly larger. For 
instance, the general absence effect on minutes absence is 5 times larger than the OLS and 10 
times larger in the estimate for the extensive margin. To be specific, the impact of permanent 
contract on general absence is that of four hours per week, this is equivalent to half working 
day. IV estimates of the contract effect on minutes absent are of smaller magnitudes but 
substantially larger than the OLS estimates. These are in the order of 30 minutes difference 
per week. Estimates of the extensive margin and absence rate for sickness absence remain 
positive but are imprecise. The larger estimated effects may reflect their Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation. One reason why the LATE may be bigger is that the 
policy reforms lead to more marginal, less productive, workers being offered permanent 
contracts.     
INSERT TABLE 4 
To this point we have found effects that are substantially larger than cohort based studies 
that examine early career workers without employment protection as they gain more 
permanent work. While we have limited our sample to temporary workers, this still includes 
workers with longer tenure and tenure is a known positive correlate of absenteeism with a 
non-linear relationship (Bradley et al., 2014), and permanent workers have markedly higher 
average tenure than temporary workers in our sample (151 months versus 22 months). To 
examine whether this different type of sample is generating our larger effects we limit our 
sample first to those workers with less than 5 years of tenure, and then those with less than 2 
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years of tenure. In this sense, this sample is closer to existing studies that look at new workers 
without employment protection.  Insofar as these studies have demonstrated smaller effects 
than our estimates, this may hinge on factors such as relatively strong career concerns early in 
employment that serve to reduce all workers absence irrespective of employment protection. 
With this in mind, we restrict our sample by tenure of the worker in their first period of 
observation in the sample. We begin initially with those up to 5 years of tenure and this is 
followed by a sample of those with less than 2 years of tenure.  
Our re-estimated IV models on these restricted samples are reported in Table 4. The first 
thing to note is that the first stage coefficients for the reforms become larger, and in general 
increase as we look at more narrow tenure groups of workers. This can be interpreted as 
showing that the effect of the reform was concentrated heavily in short tenure workers. Again 
this is interesting as it provides a suggestion of which types of workers were most readibly 
affected by these reforms.  
In terms of our absence estimates, these generally fall as we narrow the tenure group. If 
we focus on the estimates for those workers with less than 2 years tenure, a number of points 
are worth noting. General absence and sickness absence converge towards similar point 
estimates. These are in the order of a half an hour increase in absence due to assignment to a 
permanent contract as a result of the reforms. The corresponding estimates for the extensive 
margin and absence rate are between 0.01 and 0.018, although the extensive margin estimate 
for general absence is no longer statistically significant at standard levels.  
Again we can use these estimates to compute weekly loss of time due to absence as a 
result of moving into a permanent contract. For workers with less than 5 years tenure this 
amounts to approximately 0.198 of a day per week in general absence, of which 0.087 is 
absence reported as being due to sickness. For workers with less than 2 years tenure it ranges 
between 0.076 of a day for general absence, and 0.069 for sickness absence.  Even in this 
very narrow tenure window our general absence effect is almost twice of that reported by the 
least conservative current estimates in the literature (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005). Moving to 
the 5 year tenure group our general absence effect of being employed on a permanent 
contract is some 5 times larger than that reported in Ichino and Riphahn (2005), and over ten 
times larger than that reported in Bradley et al., (2014). Our feeling that our empirical 
strategy reveals substantial effects of contract status on absence, and insofar as this is a proxy 
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for effort, productivity. This suggests that variations in employment protection can have 
marked effects on productivity both within countries, and potentially, cross-country.  
To illustrate this point we calculate an approximate cost of the effect of permanent 
contracts on productivity due to variations in sickness absence, where sickness absence 
provides the more conservative estimate. This is calculated using the average annual wages of 
a permanent worker (23,544 Euros), the number of permanent workers (11.8 Million) taken 
from the Wage Structure Survey of 2008 and Labour Force Survey of 2008, respectively. 
Assuming wage equals marginal revenue product and the constant marginal productivity, 
variations in sickness absence due to permanency equals 0.41% of GDP, or 4,445 million 
Euros.  
 
Plausible Exogeneity 
Given that the instruments do not pass standard tests of validity, although the reforms 
were not designed with absenteeism or effort explicitly in mind, one may still be concerned 
that changes in the structure of employment protection in some way directly influence 
absence behaviour. For instance, it may change the expected cost of detected shirking if there 
is an influence on outflows from unemployment. Likewise, the very nature of the reforms led 
to some lowering of dismissal costs associated with some permanent contracts, and this could 
influence absence behaviour of permanent workers. We seek to examine the effect of 
potential violations of the valid exclusion of our reforms from the absence equations using 
the plausible exogeneity bounds estimator developed by Conley et al., (2012). This method 
seeks to assess whether it is possible to provide meaningful estimates in the scenario where 
the instruments may not be validly excluded.  
  INSERT TABLE 5 
Consider the following absence equation, where Z is our instrument vector (labour 
market reforms for the corresponding treatment groups):  
ititititiit ZXPermA          (3) 
Conley et al., (2012) demonstrates that it is possible to provide informative inference even 
when there are large deviations from the exclusion restriction. Specifically, provided the 
instrument is strong, violation of the exclusion restrictions results only in a loss of precision. 
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They develop different methods that combine information in the data with priors about , 
where valid exclusion ( 0 ) is a special case, to provide valid inference regarding  . We 
adopt two approaches and the results are reported in Table 5. In the first case, we use the 
local-to-zero method that employs priors with respect to the mean and variance-covariance 
matrix structure of   to construct 95% confidence intervals for the effect of permanent 
contracts on absenteeism. The second approach we use is the Union of Confidence intervals 
approach (UCI) where 95% confidence intervals for   are obtained conditional on any 
potential value of . Taking the union of these interval estimates across different   values 
provides a conservative interval estimate for  .  In all cases our estimates of minutes absence 
remains significantly greater than zero at standard levels. Our estimates of the extensive 
margin and absence rate are less precise perhaps reflecting their limited dependent variable 
nature. Nonetheless, for general absence these remain above zero at the 95% level using the 
local to zero approximation and at the 90% confidence level for sickness absence. For the 
UCI approach lower bound confidence intervals overlap zero for these outcome measures. 
These estimates suggest that, even in the case where our instruments are not validly excluded, 
under reasonable priors the likely effect of permanent contracts on worker absence is 
significantly greater than zero.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The strong employment protection found in many areas of Europe has the potential to 
dramatically influence labour market performance and outcomes. For instance, a large 
literature has demonstrated the effects of these regimes on labour productivity and 
unemployment. Employment protections’ behavioural effect on workers is less well 
understood. A recent literature has developed examining how employment protection 
conditions worker effort. This literature has shown an effect of employment protection on 
absenteeism, but one that appears too small in magnitude to generate large differences in 
labour productivity. In practice, identifying causal effects of employment protection on effort 
is difficult, especially in a broad labour market setting. Our paper used a combination of 
within worker estimation and legislative changes in Spain as a source of exogenous variation 
in contract type to identify this effect. 
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We demonstrate large effects of temporary contract on worker absence. For instance, 
our IV estimates reveal that workers whose contracts are reassigned from temporary to 
permanent take 0.08 day more absence per week. This finding is robust to a range of sub-
samples, and attempts to address issues related to the appropriate control group, and concerns 
over validity of our exclusion restriction. This evidence suggests that variations in 
employment protection can have a marked effect on worker effort. This in turn suggests the 
potential for an effect of employment protection on cross-country variations in labour 
productivity.  
19 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D. and Angrist, J. (2001). “Consequences of employment protection? The 
case of the Americans with Disabilities Act” Journal of Political Economy, 109, 915–57. 
Addison, J., P. Teixera and J-L, Grosso (2000). “The Effect of Dismissals Protection 
on Employment: More on a Vexed Theme” Southern Economic Journal, 67(1), 105-122.  
Aghion, P., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., Howitt, P., and S. Prantl (2004). “Entry and 
Productivity Growth: Evidence from Microlevel Panel Data” Journal of the European 
Economic Association 2:2–3, 265–276. 
Arulampalam, Wiji and Alison L. Booth (1998). “Training and Labour Market 
Flexibility: Is There a Trade-off?” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 36 (4), 521–536. 
Barmby, T., Ercolani, M. and J. Treble (1999). “Sickness absence in Great Britain: 
new quarterly and annual series from the GHS and LFS, 1971-1997” Labour Market Trends, 
August, 405-415. 
Barmby, T., Ercolani, M. and J. Treble (2002). “Sickness absence: An international 
comparison” Economic Journal, 112, F315-F331. 
Bassanini, A., L. Nunziata and D. Venn (2009). “Job protection legislation and 
productivity growth in OECD countries”, Economic Policy, 24, 349-402. 
Bentolila, S., Dolado, J.J. and Jimeno, J.F. (2008). “Two-tier employment protection 
reforms: The Spanish experience” CESifo DICE Report 4/2008, 49-56. www.cesifo.de 
Blanchard, Olivier and Pedro Portugal (2001). “What Hides behind an Unemployment 
Rate: Comparing Portuguese and U.S. Labor Markets” American Economic Review 91(1), 
187-207. 
Blázquez, Maite (2012). “Sickness absence rates in Spain- Evidence for the period 
1996-2004 Cuadernos de Economía, 35, 1-8. 
Booth, Alison L., Francesconi, Marco and Jeff Frank (2002). “Temporary Jobs: 
Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?” Economic Journal, 112(480), F189-F213. 
Bradley, S., Green, Colin., and Gareth Leeves (2014). “Employment Protection, 
Threat and Incentive Effects on Worker Absence,” forthcoming, British Journal of Industrial 
Relations. 
Cappellari, Lorenzo, Carlo Dell’Aringa and Marco Leonardi (2012). “Temporary 
Employment, Job Flows and Productivity: A Tale of two Reforms,” Economic Journal 122, 
F188-F215. 
20 
 
Conley, Timothy G., Christian B. Hansen, and Peter E. Rossi. (2012) “Plausibly 
exogenous.” Review of Economics and Statistics 94: 260-272. 
De Paola, M, Scoppa, V. and Pupo, V. (2014). “Absenteeism in the Italian public 
sector : The effects of changes in sick leave policy”  Journal of Labor Economics, 32(2), 337-
360. 
Dolado, J.J. and Stucchi, R. (2008). “Do temporary contracts affect total factor 
productivity? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms” CEPR Discussion Papers, 7055. 
Dolado, J.J., Garcia-Serrano, C., Jimeno, J.F., (2002). “Drawing lessons from the 
boom of temporary jobs in Spain” Economic Journal 112 (480), F270–F295. 
Dolado, J.J., Ortigueira, S., and Stucchi, R. (2011). “Does dual employment 
protection affect TFP? Evidence from Spanish manufacturing firms,” Economics Working 
Papers 11-37 Universidad Carlos III. 
Draca, Mirko and Colin Green (2004). “The Incidence and Intensity of Employer 
Funded Training: Australian Evidence on the Impact of Flexible Work,” Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy, 51(5), 609-625. 
Engellandt, Axel and Regina T. Riphahn (2005). “Temporary Contracts and 
Employee Effort”, Labour Economics, 12, 281-299. 
García Pérez José Ignacio and Yolanda Rebollo (2009a): "The use of permanent 
contracts across Spanish regions: do regional wage subsides work? Investigaciones 
Económicas, XXXIII(1),  97-130. 
García Pérez José Ignacio and Yolanda Rebollo (2009b): “Do wage subsidies affect 
the subsequent employment stability of permanent workers?: the case of Spain”, Moneda y 
Crédito 228, 65-103. 
Green, Colin and Gareth Leeves (2004). “Casual Jobs and Internal Labour Markets,” 
Manchester School, 72 (5), 658-676. 
Green, Colin and Navarro, Maria. (2012). “Does Raising the School Leaving Age 
Reduce Teacher Effort? Evidence from a Policy Experiment”, Economic Inquiry, 50 (4), 
1018-1030. 
Guadalupe, Maria (2003) “The hidden costs of fixed term contracts: the impact on 
work accidents” Labour Economics, 10 (3), 339– 357. 
Güell, Maia and Petrongolo, Barbara (2007). “How binding are legal limits? 
Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain," Labour Economics, 14, 153-183. 
21 
 
Ichino, Andrea and Regina Riphahn (2004). “Absenteeism and Employment 
Protection: Three Case Studies.” Swedish Economic Policy Review 11. 95-114. 
Ichino, Andrea and Regina Riphahn (2005). “The Effect of Employment Protection 
on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Worker Absenteeism During and After Probation,” 
Journal of European Economic Association 3, 120-143. 
Jimeno, J. Francisco and Luis Toharia (1996) “Effort, absenteeism, and fixed term 
employment contracts,” Spanish Economic Review, 13(1), 105-119. 
Kahn, Lawrence M. (2007). “The impact of employment protection mandates on 
demographic temporary employment patterns: international microeconomic evidence,” 
Economic Journal, 117, F333-F356. 
Kahn, Lawrence M. (2010). “Employment protection reforms, employment and the 
incidence of temporary jobs in Europe: 1996-2001,” Labour Economics, 17, 1-15. 
Kugler Adriana and Giovanni Pica (2008). “Effects of employment protection on 
worker and job flows: Evidence from the 1990 Italian reform,” Labour Economics, 15, 78–
95. 
Kugler, Adriana., Jimeno, Juan F., and Hernanz Virginia (2003). “Employment 
Consequences of Restrictive Permanent Contracts: Evidence from Spanish Labor Market 
Reforms,” Working Paper (FEDEA 2003-14). 
Lazear, Edward P. (1990). “Job Security Provisions and Employment,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 105 (3), 699-726. 
Lozano, Fernando A. (2011) “The Flexibility of the Workweek in the United States: 
Evidence from the FIFA World Cup.” Economic Inquiry, 49(2), 512-529. 
Mendez, Ildefonso (2012). “Promoting Permanent Employment: Lessons from 
Spain”, SERIEs, 4 (2): 175-199. 
Olsson, Martin (2009). “Employment Protection and Absence”, Labour Economics, 
16, 208-214. 
Prescott, Edward, C (2004). “Why Do Americans Work So Much More than 
Europeans?” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 28 (1), 2-13. 
Riphahn, Regina and Anja Thalmaier (2001) "Behavioral Effects of Probation 
Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," Journal of Economics and Statistics, vol. 
221(2), pages 179-201. 
Shi, Jingye, and Mikal Skuterud (2014) “Gone Fishing! Reported Sickness 
Absenteeism and the Weather.” Economic Inquiry (forthcoming).  
22 
 
 Scoppa, V. (2010a). Shirking and Employment Protection Legislation: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment. Economics Letters, 107: 276-280. 
Scoppa, V. (2010b). Worker absenteeism and incentives: evidence from Italy, 
Managerial and Decision Economics, 31(8), 503-515. 
Timmer, Marcel P., and Bart van Ark (2005). “Does Information and Communication 
Technology Drive EU-US Productivity Growth Differentials?” Oxford Economic Papers, 57 
(4), 693-716. 
Van Ark, Bart., Mary O’Mahony., Marcel P. Timmer (2008). “The Productivity Gap 
between Europe and the United States: Trends and Causes,” The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 22(1), 25-44. 
 
23 
 
Figure 1. Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees in Spain, the 
EU-15 and EU-27 (SOURCE: EUROSTAT and Spanish Labour Force Survey) 
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Figure 2. Absenteeism and Contract Type, Spain, 1994 – 2008 (SOURCE: Spanish 
Labour Force Survey) 
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
2
2
E
x
te
n
s
iv
e
 M
a
rg
in
1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
Extensive Margin
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
3
0
0
M
in
u
te
s
 A
b
s
e
n
c
e
1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
Minutes Absence
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
A
b
s
e
n
c
e
 R
a
te
1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
Absence Rate
Permanent
Temporary
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
Table 1. Permanent Contracts and Absenteeism, Spain 1996-2008, OLS and FE Estimates 
 General Absence Sickness Absence 
 
 (OLS) (FE) (OLS) (FE) 
Extensive margin 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
     
Minutes diff 56.259*** 26.443*** 4.210*** 2.926*** 
 (0.955) (2.273) (0.484) (0.876) 
     
Absence rate 0.021*** 0.011*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,561,917 
Number of workers 830,183 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, and * indicates statistical significance at the 1% and 10% level. All models 
include controls for gender, marital status, education, age, tenure, regions, years, occupation and industry. 
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Table 2. Permanent Contracts and Sickness Absence, Spain 1996-2008, OLS and FE Estimates 
 Private Sector Public Sector 
 General Absence Sickness Absence General Absence Sickness Absence 
 (OLS) (FE) (OLS) (FE) (OLS) (FE) (OLS) (FE) 
Extensive margin 0.018*** 0.008*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.034*** -0.006 0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) 
         
Minutes diff 48.947*** 27.652*** 3.185*** 3.205*** 92.070*** 3.528 7.451*** -0.086 
 (1.008) (2.354) (0.529) (0.933) (2.712) (8.807) (1.229) (2.918) 
         
Absence rate 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.037*** 0.001 0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 1976702 585215 
Number of Workers 664705 190572 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, and ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% and 5%  level. All models include controls for gender, marital status, education, age, tenure, 
regions, years, occupation and industry. 
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Table 3.  IV Estimates Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private Sector Workers 1996-
2008.  
Panel A   
First-Stage Permanent Contract 
R 1997 0.020***    
 (0.003) 
R 2001 0.026***       
 (0.004) 
R 2002 0.007***       
 (0.002) 
R2006 0.034***      
 (0.002) 
   
Partial R-
squared 
0.0004 
F-test of excl. 84.54 
p-value 0.0000 
Hansen test 237.699 181.099 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Panel B   
 General 
Absence 
Sickness 
Absence 
Extensive 
margin 
0.183*** 0.008 
 (0.070) (0.011) 
Minutes diff 249.216*** 31.845* 
 (57.905) (17.282) 
Absence rate 0.105*** 0.004 
 (0.026) (0.008) 
Observations 1976702  
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***,  and * indicate statistical significance at the 1% and 10% level, 
respectively. All controls as per Table 1. 
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Table 4.  IV Estimates Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private Sector Workers 1996-
2008. (Tenure <5, Tenure <2)  
Panel A Tenure < 5 Tenure < 2 
First-Stage Permanent Contract Permanent Contract 
R 1997 0.054*** 0.061*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
R 2001 0.097*** 0.177*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
R 2002 0.024*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
R 2006 0.048*** 0.050*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
     
Partial R-
squared 
0.0014 0.0030 
F-test of excl. 221.31 411.90 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen test 99.800 98.357 13.849 68.686 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 
Panel B     
 General 
Absence 
Sickness Absence General 
Absence 
Sickness Absence 
Extensive 
margin 
0.018 0.017** 0.010 0.015*** 
 (0.020) (0.007) (0.015) (0.005) 
Minutes diff 95.119*** 41.985*** 36.485* 32.909*** 
 (28.177) (13.281) (20.081) (10.220) 
Absence rate 0.041*** 0.016*** 0.016* 0.017*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005) 
Observations 1408082 1144239 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. All controls as per Table 1. 
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Table 5. Plausible Exogeneity and the Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private 
Sector Workers.  
 Local to zero approximation UCI (95%) 
 Coeff 
95% Confidence 
interval 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
General Absence     
 Extensive 0.186 [0.005    0.367] -0.512 0.907 
 Minutes Absence 434.680 [171.285    698.075] 253.944 615.458 
 Absence rate 0.182 [0.067    0.297] -0.4714 0.865 
Sickness Absence     
 Extensive 0.052 [-0.007   0.111] -0.5894 0.705 
 Minutes Absence 143.877 [30.449    257.305] 61.012 226.775 
 Absence rate 0.036 [-0.016   0.087] -0.568 0.648 
Note: All controls as per Table 1.  
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Appendix.  
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics, Spain 1996-2008 
Variables All workers Temporary Permanent 
Sickness 
absence 
   
Ext. margin 0.019 0.016 0.021 
 (0.138) (0.127) (0.143) 
Minutes 
difference 31.707 26.481 34.187 
 (257.220) (235.139) (267.025) 
Absence rate 0.015 0.012 0.016 
 (0.116) (0.105 (0.121) 
General 
absence 
   
Ext. margin 0.209 0.185 0.220 
 (0.406) (0.388) (0.414) 
Minutes 
difference 250.868 192.846 278.402 
 (617.587) (521.114) (656.650) 
Absence rate 0.112 0.089 0.124 
 (0.276) (0.237) (0.292) 
Permanent 
contract 0.678 
  
 (0.467)   
Female 0.405 0.434 0.391 
 (0.491) (0.496) (0.488) 
Married 0.581 0.397 0.669 
 (0.493) (0.489) (0.471) 
Primary Educ 0.411 0.454 0.390 
 (0.492) (0.498) (0.488) 
Second Educ 0.260 0.271 0.254 
 (0.438) (0.444) (0.436) 
Higher Educ 0.329 0.275 0.355 
 (0.470) (0.446) (0.479) 
Age 16-19 0.026 0.068 0.006 
 (0.160) (0.252) (0.079) 
Age 20-24 0.106 0.215 0.054 
 (0.308) (0.411) (0.227) 
Age 25-29 0.143 0.209 0.112 
 (0.350) (0.407) (0.315) 
Age 30-34 0.138 0.144 0.135 
 (0.345) (0.351) (0.342) 
Age 35-39 0.139 0.115 0.151 
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 (0.346) (0.320) (0.358) 
Age 40-44 0.135 0.093 0.155 
 (0.342) (0.291) (0.362) 
Age 45-49 0.119 0.067 0.143 
 (0.324) (0.250) (0.350) 
Age 50-54 0.095 0.046 0.118 
 (0.293) (0.210) (0.322) 
Age 55-59 0.064 0.028 0.081 
 (0.245) (0.164) (0.273) 
Age 60-64 0.031 0.012 0.040 
 (0.172) (0.107) (0.195) 
Public Sector 0.228 0.154 0.264 
 (0.420) (0.361) (0.441) 
Tenure 110.078 21.752 150.975 
 (121.136) (41.362) (124.062) 
Observations 2561917 824487 1737430 
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Table A2. Plausible exogeneity bounds estimator, subsamples 
 
  Local to zero approximation UCI (95%) 
 Coeff 
95% Confidence 
interval 
[Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound] 
Private Sector <5yrs 
Tenure 
    
General Absence     
 Extensive 0.062 [0.001     0.122] -0.152 0.276 
 Minutes Absence 118.139 [34.294    201.985] 60.912 175.368 
 Absence rate 0.048 [0.011    0.085] -0.148 0.245 
Sickness Absence     
 Extensive 0.026 [0.006    0.045] -0.161 0.213 
 Minutes Absence 59.173 [20.534     97.813] 32.310 86.039 
 Absence rate 0.024 [0.006    0.041] -0.158 0.207 
     
Private Sector <2yrs 
Tenure 
    
General Absence     
 Extensive 0.024 [-0.019   0.068] -0.095 0.143 
 Minutes Absence 37.737 [-20.712   96.185] -0.806 76.279 
 Absence rate 0.016 [-0.010   0.042] -0.090 0.122 
Sickness Absence     
 Extensive 0.019 [0.004     0.033] -0.080 0.118 
 Minutes Absence 38.435 [10.169    66.701] 20.283 56.588 
 Absence rate 0.017 [0.005    0.030] -0.079 0.114 
Note: All controls as per Table 1.  
 
